Boys with Toys VEC denies Melbourne the opportunity to effectively scrutinise the election of Lord Mayor

The Victorian Electoral Commission to is set to deny proper and effective scrutiny of the Municipal ballot – setting the scene for a repeat of the mistakes made in conduct of the 2006 State Election.

The Victorian Electoral Commission intends on using a computerised counting system to count single-member electorates and in the process will limit opportunity for the proper and detailed scrutiny of the ballot which in turn brings the electoral system into disrepute.

There is no justification for a the use of a computerised count for single-member electorates or the City of Melbourne ‘Lord Mayor’ Leadership Team.

In multi-member electorates a computerised count can assist in the filling of casual vacancies but there is no advantage in conducting a computerised count for single-member elections. Any savings in time comes at the expense of the scrutiny of the ballot. We could very much see a repeat of the mistakes made by the Victorian Electoral Commission during the 2006 State Election. In many cases it is quicker to count the ballot manually tehn by a data-entry tabulation.

Unlike the State Election the Victorian Electoral Commission will not pre-sort ballot papers into primary votes before subjecting the ballots to a computerised data-entry count.

The process adopted by the Victorian Electoral Commission is akin to the three shells and a pea used by con artists. A ball is placed and hidden under a shell and then the shells are rotated and mixed-up and the punter has to guess which shell the pea is under.

Ballot papers will be randomly collated and batched before preferences are transcribed and data-entered into a computer. Whilst scrutineers will have the limited opportunity to observe the data-entry process they will not be able to effectively observe all ballot papers.

The quality of the count would be better if single-member electorates where counted manually as it provides more opportunity for the proper scrutiny of the ballot. By pre-sorting the ballot papers into primary votes scrutineers can follow the count and focus their attention on the votes that count. The randomisation of the data-entry process prevents the proper scrutiny of the ballot.

The Victorian Electoral Commission does not use a system of double entry validation, instead they use what is referred to as random sampling quality checking. This system has a number of short comings which is unacceptable where the results of the election are likely to be close.

Radom sampleing is fine in a manufatoring process, where strict control is not required but it would be unaceptable for a bank to use a random sampling process in the counting of money. It is also unacceptable in the counting of votes.

The time and resources required to undertake a computerised count for single-member electorates is the same, if not more, then a manual counting process. More important is that the quality of the count and the scrutiny of the ballot is significantly reduced as a result of a computerised count.

The use of a computerised counting system for single-member elections is a case of Boys with Toys.

The Victorian Electoral Commission has spent millions of dollars duplicating resources and developing a computerised counting system. having spent allthis money dupolicating systems atht are already used by the Australian Electoral Commison the VEC consider it is necessary to use the computersied counting software even though the results and savings in the process are minimal if not worst.

A computerised counting system should not be used for single member electorates.

Where a computerised count is undertaken, ballot papers should be pre-sorted into primary votes before being transcribed and data-entered into a computerised counting system.

Boys with Toys VEC denies Melbourne the opportunity to effectively scrutinise the election of Lord Mayor

The Victorian Electoral Commission to is set to deny proper and effective scrutiny of the Municipal ballot – setting the scene for a repeat of the mistakes made in conduct of the 2006 State Election.

The Victorian Electoral Commission intends on using a computerised counting system to count single-member electorates and in the process will limit opportunity for the proper and detailed scrutiny of the ballot which in turn brings the electoral system into disrepute.

There is no justification for a the use of a computerised count for single-member electorates or the City of Melbourne ‘Lord Mayor’ Leadership Team.

In multi-member electorates a computerised count can assist in the filling of casual vacancies but there is no advantage in conducting a computerised count for single-member elections. Any savings in time comes at the expense of the scrutiny of the ballot. We could very much see a repeat of the mistakes made by the Victorian Electoral Commission during the 2006 State Election. In many cases it is quicker to count the ballot manually tehn by a data-entry tabulation.

Unlike the State Election the Victorian Electoral Commission will not pre-sort ballot papers into primary votes before subjecting the ballots to a computerised data-entry count.

The process adopted by the Victorian Electoral Commission is akin to the three shells and a pea used by con artists. A ball is placed and hidden under a shell and then the shells are rotated and mixed-up and the punter has to guess which shell the pea is under.

Ballot papers will be randomly collated and batched before preferences are transcribed and data-entered into a computer. Whilst scrutineers will have the limited opportunity to observe the data-entry process they will not be able to effectively observe all ballot papers.

The quality of the count would be better if single-member electorates where counted manually as it provides more opportunity for the proper scrutiny of the ballot. By pre-sorting the ballot papers into primary votes scrutineers can follow the count and focus their attention on the votes that count. The randomisation of the data-entry process prevents the proper scrutiny of the ballot.

The Victorian Electoral Commission does not use a system of double entry validation, instead they use what is referred to as random sampling quality checking. This system has a number of short comings which is unacceptable where the results of the election are likely to be close.

Radom sampleing is fine in a manufatoring process, where strict control is not required but it would be unaceptable for a bank to use a random sampling process in the counting of money. It is also unacceptable in the counting of votes.

The time and resources required to undertake a computerised count for single-member electorates is the same, if not more, then a manual counting process. More important is that the quality of the count and the scrutiny of the ballot is significantly reduced as a result of a computerised count.

The use of a computerised counting system for single-member elections is a case of Boys with Toys.

The Victorian Electoral Commission has spent millions of dollars duplicating resources and developing a computerised counting system. having spent allthis money dupolicating systems atht are already used by the Australian Electoral Commison the VEC consider it is necessary to use the computersied counting software even though the results and savings in the process are minimal if not worst.

A computerised counting system should not be used for single member electorates.

Where a computerised count is undertaken, ballot papers should be pre-sorted into primary votes before being transcribed and data-entered into a computerised counting system.

Boys with Toys VEC denies Melbourne the opportunity to effectively scrutinise the election of Lord Mayor

The Victorian Electoral Commission to is set to deny proper and effective scrutiny of the Municipal ballot – setting the scene for a repeat of the mistakes made in conduct of the 2006 State Election.

The Victorian Electoral Commission intends on using a computerised counting system to count single-member electorates and in the process will limit opportunity for the proper and detailed scrutiny of the ballot which in turn brings the electoral system into disrepute.

There is no justification for a the use of a computerised count for single-member electorates or the City of Melbourne ‘Lord Mayor’ Leadership Team.

In multi-member electorates a computerised count can assist in the filling of casual vacancies but there is no advantage in conducting a computerised count for single-member elections. Any savings in time comes at the expense of the scrutiny of the ballot. We could very much see a repeat of the mistakes made by the Victorian Electoral Commission during the 2006 State Election. In many cases it is quicker to count the ballot manually tehn by a data-entry tabulation.

Unlike the State Election the Victorian Electoral Commission will not pre-sort ballot papers into primary votes before subjecting the ballots to a computerised data-entry count.

The process adopted by the Victorian Electoral Commission is akin to the three shells and a pea used by con artists. A ball is placed and hidden under a shell and then the shells are rotated and mixed-up and the punter has to guess which shell the pea is under.

Ballot papers will be randomly collated and batched before preferences are transcribed and data-entered into a computer. Whilst scrutineers will have the limited opportunity to observe the data-entry process they will not be able to effectively observe all ballot papers.

The quality of the count would be better if single-member electorates where counted manually as it provides more opportunity for the proper scrutiny of the ballot. By pre-sorting the ballot papers into primary votes scrutineers can follow the count and focus their attention on the votes that count. The randomisation of the data-entry process prevents the proper scrutiny of the ballot.

The Victorian Electoral Commission does not use a system of double entry validation, instead they use what is referred to as random sampling quality checking. This system has a number of short comings which is unacceptable where the results of the election are likely to be close.

Radom sampleing is fine in a manufatoring process, where strict control is not required but it would be unaceptable for a bank to use a random sampling process in the counting of money. It is also unacceptable in the counting of votes.

The time and resources required to undertake a computerised count for single-member electorates is the same, if not more, then a manual counting process. More important is that the quality of the count and the scrutiny of the ballot is significantly reduced as a result of a computerised count.

The use of a computerised counting system for single-member elections is a case of Boys with Toys.

The Victorian Electoral Commission has spent millions of dollars duplicating resources and developing a computerised counting system. having spent allthis money dupolicating systems atht are already used by the Australian Electoral Commison the VEC consider it is necessary to use the computersied counting software even though the results and savings in the process are minimal if not worst.

A computerised counting system should not be used for single member electorates.

Where a computerised count is undertaken, ballot papers should be pre-sorted into primary votes before being transcribed and data-entered into a computerised counting system.

Scrutinising elections in e-Space Ongoing of concern about the conduct of electronic voting and the need for information to be readily available

The conduct of the 2006 Victorian State election had little to be desired, with the Victorian Electoral Commission again proving that it is the lesser of the two public authorities responsible for the conduct of public elections in Victoria.

The refusal of the VEC to publish detailed polling booth data for the Legislative Council and its failure to provide statistical information on the number of ballot papers issued prior to Saturday’s election has denied Victorians the right of an open and transparent election.

We are told that the reason that polling booth data was not provided is that the ABC
thought that the information was unnecessary for their purposes. If the provision of relevant data was too much for the ABC then the VEC should have produced two separate data files and left it up to the ABC what they wanted to report on.

The VEC has an obligation that goes beyond information the media. It is about maintaining open and transparent process.

Question: Will the polling booth data and below-the line-preference data be readily available after the declaration of the poll or do we have to FOI them again?

In future hopefully those in the loop will not only recommended but insist on full disclose of detailed election results and that includes producing data on the number of postal votes, pre-poll ballots issued along with electronic votes being identifiable from ordinary manual votes.

The issue of the VEC accessing the e-voting data before the close of the poll raises a number of issues of ongoing concern about the security of the electronic voting voting system that’s been implemented. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that the results are true and accurate and subject to independent, effective and proper scrutiny?

The recent mid term elections in the USA also highlight a number of issues.

The world was told that Florida’s elections were a true and accurate account, but there was no way to independently verify the fact.

Our system is a little different. We have a a preferential voting system, one of the worlds best and most democratic. With preferential voting the need to provide the preference data used to calculate the results is crucial. Even more so when it involves a third-party data-entry process.

Whilst there are some mechanisms in place to limit some data-entry transcription problems the system is still is open and susceptible to errors.

In previous election counts the VEC refused to do a preliminary manual throw of preferences, preferring to jump in and start the random data-entry process. This resulted in nightmare as it made it extremely difficult and close to impossible for scrutineers to monitor the accuracy of the computerised data-entry count. Another check digit removed.

A preliminary throw of the below-the-line votes not only helps with analyzing the outcome of the election but it also assists in the data-entry and scrutiny of the ballot. Scrutineers can decide which votes are of interest and devote resources accordingly. (We had the absurd situation, during the Melbourne City Council and other municipal elections, where if there was 20 candidates and 20 data-entry personal up to 400 scrutineers would have been required to properly scrutinise the data-entry process) Without a preliminary manual distribution scrutineers were denied the right to effectively monitor the various processes.

Unlike the VEC the AEC also provided information on the informal votes which was included in the data-set the AEC provided. This was very interesting and useful as votes of interest could be identified, pulled out and rechecked.

In providing copies of the preference data-set, Scrutineers are afforded the opportunity of undertaking independent analysis of the data as the count unfolds. Various electronic data queries could be run against copies of the data, queries that would not normally be undertaken by the electoral office, highlighting again votes of interest that could then be subject to a secondary glance and review.

Most of the issues discussed above diminish if and when we remove the third-party data-entry process altogether and voters record their electronic vote directly. As we move closer an closer to a time when voters will use computer technology to record their votes directly in real time new and additional issues of concern begin to rise . Issues such as the electorate office undertaking a preliminary count of the vote prior to the close of the poll. (As appears to have been the case in this election)

Electronic voting machines MUST be fitted with write once read only recording devices so that we can be confident that the data has not been hacked into from a central location out in cyberspace. Copies of this data and backup disk must be made available to scrutineers at the close of the poll. Each unit must also be stand alone and not be reliant on a central data connection. The last thing you want is someone with access to this data recording information, unknown to others misusing that data by either changing a few preferences or selling the information to interested parties (Political and commercial). At the conclusion of the count a certified and digitally signed data copy of all votes and preferences MUST be published on the Governments Internet site as part of the declaration procedures.

The issues that have been identified in America are the same here and world wide. The more elections move into e-Space the greater the significance in the provision of data in order to ensure that the election process remains open and transparent and is subject to independent public scrutiny. Without this information, as has been evident in this count, the public and scrutineers are left in the dark.

In previous elections polling booth data and the number of ballot papers issued were available and should have been in this election.

Scrutinising elections in e-Space Ongoing of concern about the conduct of electronic voting and the need for information to be readily available

The conduct of the 2006 Victorian State election had little to be desired, with the Victorian Electoral Commission again proving that it is the lesser of the two public authorities responsible for the conduct of public elections in Victoria.

The refusal of the VEC to publish detailed polling booth data for the Legislative Council and its failure to provide statistical information on the number of ballot papers issued prior to Saturday’s election has denied Victorians the right of an open and transparent election.

We are told that the reason that polling booth data was not provided is that the ABC
thought that the information was unnecessary for their purposes. If the provision of relevant data was too much for the ABC then the VEC should have produced two separate data files and left it up to the ABC what they wanted to report on.

The VEC has an obligation that goes beyond information the media. It is about maintaining open and transparent process.

Question: Will the polling booth data and below-the line-preference data be readily available after the declaration of the poll or do we have to FOI them again?

In future hopefully those in the loop will not only recommended but insist on full disclose of detailed election results and that includes producing data on the number of postal votes, pre-poll ballots issued along with electronic votes being identifiable from ordinary manual votes.

The issue of the VEC accessing the e-voting data before the close of the poll raises a number of issues of ongoing concern about the security of the electronic voting voting system that’s been implemented. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that the results are true and accurate and subject to independent, effective and proper scrutiny?

The recent mid term elections in the USA also highlight a number of issues.

The world was told that Florida’s elections were a true and accurate account, but there was no way to independently verify the fact.

Our system is a little different. We have a a preferential voting system, one of the worlds best and most democratic. With preferential voting the need to provide the preference data used to calculate the results is crucial. Even more so when it involves a third-party data-entry process.

Whilst there are some mechanisms in place to limit some data-entry transcription problems the system is still is open and susceptible to errors.

In previous election counts the VEC refused to do a preliminary manual throw of preferences, preferring to jump in and start the random data-entry process. This resulted in nightmare as it made it extremely difficult and close to impossible for scrutineers to monitor the accuracy of the computerised data-entry count. Another check digit removed.

A preliminary throw of the below-the-line votes not only helps with analyzing the outcome of the election but it also assists in the data-entry and scrutiny of the ballot. Scrutineers can decide which votes are of interest and devote resources accordingly. (We had the absurd situation, during the Melbourne City Council and other municipal elections, where if there was 20 candidates and 20 data-entry personal up to 400 scrutineers would have been required to properly scrutinise the data-entry process) Without a preliminary manual distribution scrutineers were denied the right to effectively monitor the various processes.

Unlike the VEC the AEC also provided information on the informal votes which was included in the data-set the AEC provided. This was very interesting and useful as votes of interest could be identified, pulled out and rechecked.

In providing copies of the preference data-set, Scrutineers are afforded the opportunity of undertaking independent analysis of the data as the count unfolds. Various electronic data queries could be run against copies of the data, queries that would not normally be undertaken by the electoral office, highlighting again votes of interest that could then be subject to a secondary glance and review.

Most of the issues discussed above diminish if and when we remove the third-party data-entry process altogether and voters record their electronic vote directly. As we move closer an closer to a time when voters will use computer technology to record their votes directly in real time new and additional issues of concern begin to rise . Issues such as the electorate office undertaking a preliminary count of the vote prior to the close of the poll. (As appears to have been the case in this election)

Electronic voting machines MUST be fitted with write once read only recording devices so that we can be confident that the data has not been hacked into from a central location out in cyberspace. Copies of this data and backup disk must be made available to scrutineers at the close of the poll. Each unit must also be stand alone and not be reliant on a central data connection. The last thing you want is someone with access to this data recording information, unknown to others misusing that data by either changing a few preferences or selling the information to interested parties (Political and commercial). At the conclusion of the count a certified and digitally signed data copy of all votes and preferences MUST be published on the Governments Internet site as part of the declaration procedures.

The issues that have been identified in America are the same here and world wide. The more elections move into e-Space the greater the significance in the provision of data in order to ensure that the election process remains open and transparent and is subject to independent public scrutiny. Without this information, as has been evident in this count, the public and scrutineers are left in the dark.

In previous elections polling booth data and the number of ballot papers issued were available and should have been in this election.

Scrutinising elections in e-Space Ongoing of concern about the conduct of electronic voting and the need for information to be readily available

The conduct of the 2006 Victorian State election had little to be desired, with the Victorian Electoral Commission again proving that it is the lesser of the two public authorities responsible for the conduct of public elections in Victoria.

The refusal of the VEC to publish detailed polling booth data for the Legislative Council and its failure to provide statistical information on the number of ballot papers issued prior to Saturday’s election has denied Victorians the right of an open and transparent election.

We are told that the reason that polling booth data was not provided is that the ABC
thought that the information was unnecessary for their purposes. If the provision of relevant data was too much for the ABC then the VEC should have produced two separate data files and left it up to the ABC what they wanted to report on.

The VEC has an obligation that goes beyond information the media. It is about maintaining open and transparent process.

Question: Will the polling booth data and below-the line-preference data be readily available after the declaration of the poll or do we have to FOI them again?

In future hopefully those in the loop will not only recommended but insist on full disclose of detailed election results and that includes producing data on the number of postal votes, pre-poll ballots issued along with electronic votes being identifiable from ordinary manual votes.

The issue of the VEC accessing the e-voting data before the close of the poll raises a number of issues of ongoing concern about the security of the electronic voting voting system that’s been implemented. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that the results are true and accurate and subject to independent, effective and proper scrutiny?

The recent mid term elections in the USA also highlight a number of issues.

The world was told that Florida’s elections were a true and accurate account, but there was no way to independently verify the fact.

Our system is a little different. We have a a preferential voting system, one of the worlds best and most democratic. With preferential voting the need to provide the preference data used to calculate the results is crucial. Even more so when it involves a third-party data-entry process.

Whilst there are some mechanisms in place to limit some data-entry transcription problems the system is still is open and susceptible to errors.

In previous election counts the VEC refused to do a preliminary manual throw of preferences, preferring to jump in and start the random data-entry process. This resulted in nightmare as it made it extremely difficult and close to impossible for scrutineers to monitor the accuracy of the computerised data-entry count. Another check digit removed.

A preliminary throw of the below-the-line votes not only helps with analyzing the outcome of the election but it also assists in the data-entry and scrutiny of the ballot. Scrutineers can decide which votes are of interest and devote resources accordingly. (We had the absurd situation, during the Melbourne City Council and other municipal elections, where if there was 20 candidates and 20 data-entry personal up to 400 scrutineers would have been required to properly scrutinise the data-entry process) Without a preliminary manual distribution scrutineers were denied the right to effectively monitor the various processes.

Unlike the VEC the AEC also provided information on the informal votes which was included in the data-set the AEC provided. This was very interesting and useful as votes of interest could be identified, pulled out and rechecked.

In providing copies of the preference data-set, Scrutineers are afforded the opportunity of undertaking independent analysis of the data as the count unfolds. Various electronic data queries could be run against copies of the data, queries that would not normally be undertaken by the electoral office, highlighting again votes of interest that could then be subject to a secondary glance and review.

Most of the issues discussed above diminish if and when we remove the third-party data-entry process altogether and voters record their electronic vote directly. As we move closer an closer to a time when voters will use computer technology to record their votes directly in real time new and additional issues of concern begin to rise . Issues such as the electorate office undertaking a preliminary count of the vote prior to the close of the poll. (As appears to have been the case in this election)

Electronic voting machines MUST be fitted with write once read only recording devices so that we can be confident that the data has not been hacked into from a central location out in cyberspace. Copies of this data and backup disk must be made available to scrutineers at the close of the poll. Each unit must also be stand alone and not be reliant on a central data connection. The last thing you want is someone with access to this data recording information, unknown to others misusing that data by either changing a few preferences or selling the information to interested parties (Political and commercial). At the conclusion of the count a certified and digitally signed data copy of all votes and preferences MUST be published on the Governments Internet site as part of the declaration procedures.

The issues that have been identified in America are the same here and world wide. The more elections move into e-Space the greater the significance in the provision of data in order to ensure that the election process remains open and transparent and is subject to independent public scrutiny. Without this information, as has been evident in this count, the public and scrutineers are left in the dark.

In previous elections polling booth data and the number of ballot papers issued were available and should have been in this election.

Lost in e-Space Questions asked about security and probity of e-Voting centers go unanswered

The VEC has reported that it has already undertaken analysis and processed voting result from e-Voting centres which raises a number of questions such as what sort of analysis has been undertaken and who has access to this data and how secure is the information?

The VEC assures us that it is secure but will not say what sort of reports and analysis have been undertaken. It is one thing to collect statistical information on e_voting system but it is another if the results of the e-voting have been analysed in the absence of public scrutiny and independent review.

It is wrong to ascertain the results of voting before the close of the polls on Saturday 6:00PM November 25, 2006. This sort of information is readily open to abuse and goes well beyond the sort of sampling you would expect from public opinion poll.

If the information is purely of a statistical nature (i.e.. No results or analysis of voting has been undertaken) then why has this statistical information not been made public.

Information on the number of people who have voted, the number of postal vote application and pre-poll voting should be readily available and published daily on the VEC web site. It’s akin to holding an election and not knowing teh total number enrolled.

The main problem as we see it is that the processing of this information is undertaken in e-Space and, it would appear, not subject to proper public scrutiny.

Having asked questions as to the type of analysis and summary data produced the VEC have gone silent.

We have already expressed concern that postal voting application statistics are not readily available and are missing from the reports we have received. Lost in e-Space.

Much more review and analysis is required of our e-voting system before public confidence is assured. The Key to maintaining public confidence is the publication of all statistical data so as to ensure the conduct of elections is open and transparent and subject to proper scrutiny. Something that is missing when information is denied or not available. It is not good enough to just say “Trust us”.

Lost in e-Space Questions asked about security and probity of e-Voting centers go unanswered

The VEC has reported that it has already undertaken analysis and processed voting result from e-Voting centres which raises a number of questions such as what sort of analysis has been undertaken and who has access to this data and how secure is the information?

The VEC assures us that it is secure but will not say what sort of reports and analysis have been undertaken. It is one thing to collect statistical information on e_voting system but it is another if the results of the e-voting have been analysed in the absence of public scrutiny and independent review.

It is wrong to ascertain the results of voting before the close of the polls on Saturday 6:00PM November 25, 2006. This sort of information is readily open to abuse and goes well beyond the sort of sampling you would expect from public opinion poll.

If the information is purely of a statistical nature (i.e.. No results or analysis of voting has been undertaken) then why has this statistical information not been made public.

Information on the number of people who have voted, the number of postal vote application and pre-poll voting should be readily available and published daily on the VEC web site. It’s akin to holding an election and not knowing teh total number enrolled.

The main problem as we see it is that the processing of this information is undertaken in e-Space and, it would appear, not subject to proper public scrutiny.

Having asked questions as to the type of analysis and summary data produced the VEC have gone silent.

We have already expressed concern that postal voting application statistics are not readily available and are missing from the reports we have received. Lost in e-Space.

Much more review and analysis is required of our e-voting system before public confidence is assured. The Key to maintaining public confidence is the publication of all statistical data so as to ensure the conduct of elections is open and transparent and subject to proper scrutiny. Something that is missing when information is denied or not available. It is not good enough to just say “Trust us”.

Lost in e-Space Questions asked about security and probity of e-Voting centers go unanswered

The VEC has reported that it has already undertaken analysis and processed voting result from e-Voting centres which raises a number of questions such as what sort of analysis has been undertaken and who has access to this data and how secure is the information?

The VEC assures us that it is secure but will not say what sort of reports and analysis have been undertaken. It is one thing to collect statistical information on e_voting system but it is another if the results of the e-voting have been analysed in the absence of public scrutiny and independent review.

It is wrong to ascertain the results of voting before the close of the polls on Saturday 6:00PM November 25, 2006. This sort of information is readily open to abuse and goes well beyond the sort of sampling you would expect from public opinion poll.

If the information is purely of a statistical nature (i.e.. No results or analysis of voting has been undertaken) then why has this statistical information not been made public.

Information on the number of people who have voted, the number of postal vote application and pre-poll voting should be readily available and published daily on the VEC web site. It’s akin to holding an election and not knowing teh total number enrolled.

The main problem as we see it is that the processing of this information is undertaken in e-Space and, it would appear, not subject to proper public scrutiny.

Having asked questions as to the type of analysis and summary data produced the VEC have gone silent.

We have already expressed concern that postal voting application statistics are not readily available and are missing from the reports we have received. Lost in e-Space.

Much more review and analysis is required of our e-voting system before public confidence is assured. The Key to maintaining public confidence is the publication of all statistical data so as to ensure the conduct of elections is open and transparent and subject to proper scrutiny. Something that is missing when information is denied or not available. It is not good enough to just say “Trust us”.